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Although I have never sat in his classroom, Philip Bobbitt has been
one of my greatest teachers. His book Constitutional Fate1 is one of a
handful of truly towering works of constitutional theory in the last half-
century. On my shelf, it sits exactly where it belongs-alongside other
classics such as Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal
System, 2 Charles Black's Structure and Relationship in Constitutional
Law,3 Larry Tribe's American Constitutional Law,4 John Hart Ely's De-
mocracy and Distrust,5 and Bruce Ackerman's R& the People.6 In my
view, Bobbitt and this inspiring book have yet to get the praise they
deserve.
I choose the words "constitutional theory" advisedly. They track the
subtitle of Bobbitts book: "Theory of the Constitution." And Bobbitt's is
one of those rare works that has taught me about both the Constitution and
theory-about both the law (substantively) and law (methodologically). I
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also choose the word "inspiring" advisedly, for Bobbitt's book has-in
quite concrete ways-inspired me and inspired ideas in me; it has helped
me see how the law game is played and (I hope) has helped me play it
better and teach it to my students. Bobbitt's modalities are key tools for
me in the classroom.7 Bobbitt's book has also inspired quite concrete
substantive insights about our Constitution and about the work of other
students of the Constitution, both judicial and academic. These substantive
insights have also featured prominently in my classroom. In short, in'
every class I teach, and in everything I write, Bobbitt's book is in my
mind, influencing and inspiring me.
Now all this praise is not just so much hot air-the kind of cheap stuff
one says but does not mean. And to prove this, I shall briefly canvass my
own scholarship to date to trace my debt to Bobbitt's work.
In my first work as a professor, published in 1985, I set out to defini-
tively resolve the classic debate over congressional power to strip juris-
diction from federal courts! (Ah, the brashness of youth!) As both the
text and the footnotes of that article make clear, I was acutely self-
conscious about interpretive methodology-about how textual, historical,
structural, and doctrinal arguments might cohere or diverge. In particular,
I pointedly sought to avoid reliance on secret history that left no textual
trace, and this theme ran throughout my article. In my final footnote,9 I
identified the source of this methodological self-consciousness: an article
in the Texas Law Review, by Philip Bobbitt, entitled Constitutional Fate.1"
Two years later, I wrote a short bicentennial essay titled Our Forgot-
ten Constitution." One of its central themes was that reliance on secret
history should be distinguished from, rather than equated with, textual
argument in constitutional theory. Once again, my debt to Bobbitt should
be evident.
The following year, I wrote an essay on the constitutional amendment
process."2 My only citation to Bobbitt was for an important empirical
proposition about the average length of tenure for senior congressmen
compared to the average tenure of Supreme Court Justices.1 3  But
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Bobbitt's modes of argument were very much in mind when I crafted my
arguments, as I noted in a letter to Bobbitt that year:
I describe my arguments on [pages 1043-72] as based on "text,
history and structure" [page 1072]. I don't identify the arguments
at [page 1073] ("There is no principled stopping point . . . ") as
"doctrinal;" or the discussion of the People's "definition of itself" at
[page 1075] as "ethical"; or Section V as "prudential." Neverthe-
less, I think you will recognize these modal arguments as such.
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In 1989, 1 published a book review of the third edition of the classic
Hart and Wechsler casebook.'5 Bobbitt's ideas on the nature of doctrinal
argument-and his brilliant exposition of the legal process school and
the work of Henry Hart-were utterly indispensable to me. I wrote in a
footnote:
See P. BOBBrrr, CONSTrrUTIONAL FATE 43 (1982) ("This extra-
ordinary work [HART & WECHSLER] is perhaps the most influential
casebook ever written. It is the book most frequently cited by the
Supreme Court both generally and in constitutional opinions."). It
should be noted that Professor Bobbitt's book is itself an extra-
ordinary work that has deeply influenced the general ideas and
approach of this Review.17
Later that year, I reviewed Sandy Levinson's wonderfully thought-
provoking book, Constitutional Faith, in the Texas Law Review.'8 Once
again, I found Bobbitt's teaching particularly illuminating: "I am not sure
that Professor Philip Bobbitt-whose own brilliant book, Constitutional
Fate, Levinson cites at this point-would agree with his colleague's
conclusion as to the hopeless inconsistency of the modalities of constitu-
tional argument."19 I again cited to Professor Bobbitt in making a similar
point in a 1991 essay: "There is no magical constitutional genie that breaks
my kneecaps when I misinterpret. There are, however, generally accepted
interpretive conventions that render some readings better than others."'
In 1992, I wrote an essay trying to definitively resolve the classic
debate over incorporation-whether and how the Bill of Rights applied to
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the states.2" (Ah, the arrogance of middle age!) Though my article
seemingly cited Bobbitt only in passing,' his insights into that debate
were absolutely formative in my own thinking. It was no coincidence,
Bobbitt argued, that the most prominent modem advocate of incorporation,
Justice Hugo Black, was a textualist, or that his brand of incorporation was
literalistic and mechanical.' As Bobbitt observed:
The doctrine of incorporation is crucial to the textual approach, since
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment by itself is too sparse to
provide the common phrases on which the textualist relies. Indeed,
one may say that the development of this doctrine was driven by the
theoretical requirements of textual argument.
Or, as I later put the point,
[F]or Black, part of the appeal of incorporation lay in its mechanical
quality-its apparent ability to reduce judicial discretion by es-
tablishing an exact identity between the broad language of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the seemingly more specific rules of Amend-
ments I-VIII.. . . As Professor Bobbitt has noted... incorporation
did enable Black to substitute a longer set of words in the original
Bill for the shorter set in the key sentence of Section One-no small
thing to a textualist. 5
Armed with Bobbitt's insight, I began to wonder whether the Fourteenth
Amendment might best be understood as incorporating principles-rights,
freedoms, privileges, and immunities-rather than words-that is, amend-
ments as such. And this wondering eventually led me to develop what I
have called "refined incorporation."' So, here too, I am in Bobbitt's
debt.
I could go on-but I won't, for I hope the point is clear. In virtually
every way-methodologically, substantively, and even empirically-I have
profited enormously from Philip Bobbitt's book Constitutional Fate and the
Texas Law Review article from which it derives. His new book, Constitu-
tional Interpretation, carries on this tradition nobly and well-and I am
sure that it, too, will shape my mind in the years to come. I salute
Professor Bobbitt, and I commend his work to all.
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